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I. NATURE OF THE PROBLEM
This paper investigates some alternative definitions of labor for produc-
tivity and demand analysis. The central issue requires introducing notions of
"skill" into the production function and revolves around the nebulous concept
of labor quality and the existence of meaningful aggregates of heterogeneous
labor services. While capital aggregation has been discussed at length, far
less attention has been devoted to labor aggregation, though the required struc-
ture is different enough to warrant independent development. A fundamental
feature of labor is that the supply of potential services of any worker typically
spans a much broader spectrum than those actually put to use in the market.
Specialization and division of labor in the organization of work activities
are ubiquitous; suggesting that labor markets might be-usefully analyzed as
marriage markets, matching workers to jobs. Central to this view is the fact
that the distribution of potential skills among members of the labor force
renders some individuals more capable of performing certain jobs than others.
The work reported below illustrates some of these issues, based on the theory
of optimal assignments (Koopmans and Beckmann), the Ricardian theory of compara-
tive advantage (especially the development of Dorfman, Sainuelson and Solow) and
the theory of marriage (Becker).
Three approaches have guided empirical work in this field and this work
is related to all of them:2
(1) Economists working In the human capital tradition have maintained
a distinction between "raw labor" and human capital, measuring the latter by
a wage—weighted Index of the distribution of education in the labor force,
thereby In effect including education as a factor of production. This split
obviously follows quantity/quality lines and appears to be a natural first—
approximation toward measuring labor in efficiency units. However, It has
not fully adressed the heterogeneity issue and substitution among various
types of human capital. We begin to analyze some of those factors here.
(ii) Duality theory offers a wide variety of feasible empirical specifi-
cations for production functions involving many factors of production and
empirical applications have disaggregated labor according to official skill
and occupational categories. This approach relates various labor inputs to
their functions as productive agents more closely than the human capital ap-
proach, but appears to be less than fundamental. First, the principles under-
lying official classifications are not transparent. Second, technological
factors alone almost never determine the content of work activity and what
is called a job. The bundling of work activities into packages labeled jobs
and occupations is at least as much influenced by economic decisions affecting
the organization of production as by the technology per Se. There is no better
example than Smith's pin factory. "Pin Maker" would represent an adequate occu-
pational classification with the crudest kind of organization, whereas a more
sophisticated organization would call for distinguishing among wire stretchers,
point sharpeners and so on. Some examples of the endogenity of occupational
classifications are shown below.
(lii) There has been some attempt (Welch) to reduce the dimenslonality of
labor inputs using an unobserved factor approach. This method assumes that3
labor services in production can be represented by a small set of latent, un-
observed factors, with observed labor categories embodying these factors in
alternative proportions (fixed "within" but varying "between"). For example,
the latent factors might be strength and intelligence, and the observed labor
categories might be several education groups cross—classified by race, sex and
work experience. A market arbitrage argument is used to establish restrictions
among wages in the observed categories. Assuming that any vector of unobserved
factors can be achieved by linear bundles of observed categories, observed wages
in each category must be similar linear combinations of the implicit prices of
the unobserved components. The latter form a basis for reducing the dimension—
ality of the input space to the number of latent variables. A difficulty with
this technique is that it may not survive aggregation over several goods with
dissimilar latent factor technologies. Furthermore, the underlying hypothesis
that workers embody fixed bundles of characteristics that are linearly combin-
able does not necessarily accord with the principles of comparative advantage
and the virtues of specialization, so that some investigation of the practical
limitations of the method is worthwhile.
The paper is organized as follows: Section II considers the organization
of work activities in a simple fixed coefficient technology in the presence of
comparative advantage among various classes of workers. Assuming that the num-
ber of independent productive activities exceeds the number of comparative
advantage classes, an application of the envelope theorem shows the derivation
from first principles of a neoclassical production function with input dimen-
sion (the number of workers of each type) smaller than the engineering technology
(the number of activities). This is the basic result illustrating that occupa-
tional classifications depend on both the technology and the distribution of4
skills (factor supplies) in the working population, a fact thatmay be relevant
to international and other cross—sectionaldjfferences in productivity and the
demand for labor. The situation is reversed in section III, which treats the
case where the number of worker classifications exceeds the number of production
activities. In this case the micro—technology cannot be reduced below the basic
set of work activities one starts with, and within these categories labor can
be aggregated according to efficiency units. However, the nature of factor
endowments in economies of this sort is rather different than in the neoclassi-
cal model, and leads to an output transformation function that has all the neo-
classical properties. This result is reminiscent of an example of Houthakker
(also, see Sato) who also obtained smooth neoclassical behavioral functions from
underlying distributional phenomena. Section IV examines the characteristics——
factor approach to labor aggregation and relates it to the results in section III,
noting an inherent difficulty arising from selectivity of various ability groups
of workers among work activities due to comparative advantage. In effect, the
existence of rent destroys the possibility of simple linear aggregation. The
point is also related to a general approach to income distribution originated
by A.D. Roy and carried forward by Tinbergen, Mandelbrot, Houthakker and Sattinger.
Finally, section V indicates some problems with applying the theory of marriage
directly to labor demand. These issues become most interesting when there are
incomplete markets that limit the gains from fully exploiting comparative advan-
tage, due to transactions costs. The results are limited, but some examples
show that any predictions concerning positive or negative assortive matching
of workers depends not only on the correlation of talentsamong members of the
work force, but also on the nature of technology and the distribution of demands
for various outputs.5
II. AN INDIRECT PRODUCTION FUNCTION
A basic result on the virtues of specialization and optimum job assignments
in the presence of comparative advantage is most easily shown in the context of
a simple engineering production function with fixed coefficients. Capital is
ignored, without apology, in what follows. Let x be output and T1 be a produc-
tion activity. The technology is given by
x =min(T1/a1,T2/a2,...,T/a) (1)
whereaj is the activity input requirement per unit output. For concreteness
think of (1) as the engineering production function for Smith's pin factory,
with the T representing all the independent steps in the productionprocess,
such as drawing the wire, sharpening the points, and so forth. More generally,
it is natural and convenient to associate T. with independent "tasks," a collec-
tion of which constitutes a job. Let there be rn types of workers. Workers of
each type are differentiated by a capacity vector(t1.,t2.,. .,t), j,. .,rn,
with t1. indicating the maximum amount of activity I obtainable from workers of
type j. These maximal amounts occur when a single activity is pursued full time.
However, a worker's time may be divided among several activities. Assume that
output in each activity is strictly proportional to the time devoted to it, with
no further interactions from mixing activities. Thus the direct virtues of
specialization due to indivisibilities, on—the—job learning and innovation dis-
cussed by Smith are ignored. Comparing workersand 1, worker j will be said
to have a comparative advantage in task h relative to task k ifthj/tkj >thi/tki•
Equivalently, worker I has a comparative advantage in task k. Comparative advan-
tage is assumed to exist in all tasks and among all types, i.e.,6
thj/tkj thi/tki (2)
for all pairs (h,k) and (j,i).
A familiar diagram illustrates the situation when there are two activities
and two types. Twoworkersare shown in Figure 1, A and B, with A having com-
parative advantage in and B in T1. An efficient assignment maximizes the
activity levels attainable from a given labor force and the efficient frontier
has two facets: Along the upper edge A is completely specialized to and B
engages in both activities, since B is assigned to T1 first due to comparative
advantage there (fractional assignments will be the rule and not the exception
in this problem). A is completely specialized to 2 and B toT1 at the corner.
Only if the production requirement for T1 exceeds !lB is it efficient to allocate
some fraction of A's time to T1, and along the lower edge B is specialized to
while A does both. All other assignments sacrifice activities. For example
the most inefficient (the dotted line segments) assign inversely to comparative
advantage (B specialized to and A fractionally assigned along the upper edge,
etc). Of more interest is the case of no specialization, where A and B act as
independent agents of production. Since the engineering technology dictates
activities in fixed proportions, the maximum total activity levels in this
case are the sums of A's and B's separate activity levels along arbitrary rays
through the origin——the dashed line. It is inefficient because no comparative
advantage is exploited. The gains from forming a production team and taking
advantage of different talents by optimum assignment are shown by the shaded
area. Evidently comparative advantage produces a superadditivity or synergy.
This interactive effect captures a fundamental notion of "complementarity" in
production.17
While this example is well known certain features have no counterpart
in its use in trade theory and form a more fundamental basis for production
theory. In particular, it is possible to derive a quasi—concave production







+ T2/t2 + ...+T/t N,, j =l,2,...,m(4)
where is the number of workers of type j available. Then the envelope
theorem proves that there exist nonnegative multipliers (q1,.. .,q)
and a
quasi—concave function x =F(N1,N2,...,N) such that
x =F(N1,...,N) =max[min{ET1/a1....ET/a} T j 3
ij (5)
+ Eq (N. —ET1It1.)] j3ij 3
Thefunction F(N) Is an efficient ttindirectt production function.2 Its deri-
vatives when defined satisfy ax/N1 =q1and represent induced marginal products
of worker types rather than of production activities.3 The theory holds for
any n and rn, not necessarily of the same dimension, but gains considerable
practical interest when the number of activities (n) greatly exceeds the number
of types of workers (in).8
Construction of an indirect production function in the 2 x 2 case follows
directly from Figure land illustrates thegeneral method. Consider theproblem
of producing one unit of x with alternative numbers of types of workers. If
only type A workers are available, then al/tiA + a2/t2A of them are required.
Similarly, if only B workers are available, then al/tlB ÷a2/t2Bof them are
necessary. Suppose t2AIt]A >t2B/tlB
as before. Then at the specialization
point in Figurel,B is assigned to l and A to T2, and if NA =a2/t2Aand NB =
a1/t13one unit of x is produced. These threepossibilities are shown inFigure 2.
However, Figure lshows that anylinear mixtures of A's and B's between adjacent
points in Figure 2 are efficient because they follow optimum assignments: The
two connected line segments in Figure 2 are dual to the activity possibility
frontier, with the upper edge corresponding to specialization of B (the lower
face in Figure 1) and the lower one corresponding to specialization of A. In
fact the connected lines in Figure 2 represent the efficient unit isoquant——
the level set of F(NA,NB) in this case——and serve as a perfectly adequate
basis for a production function.
There are inefficient production functions as well. For example, corres-
ponding to no specialization in Figure 1 would be the straight line connecting
the intercepts of Figure 2. Here NA and B appear as perfect substitutes with
efficiency units measured by total product per worker. Corresponding to the
perverse assignment in Figure 1 are the lines connecting the intercepts and the
cross in Figure 2. This argument immediately shows that the efficient indirect
production function is quasi—concave: It exhibits substitution even though
the underlying factors are in some sense complements. The marginal rate of
substitution is tlB/t in the branch where B is specialized and is t2B/t2A in9
the branch where A is specialized. These are determined by factor skill
endowments only and are independent of the technology. Imperfect substitu-
tion around the corner does depend on the technology, but its extent also
depends on the "distance" between skill endowments of worker types. A dif-
ferent configuration of input requirements, a1, changes the location of the
corner. Whatever its location, curvature around the corner depends on the
extent of comparative advantage t2A/tlA *t2B/tlB•
The experiment resulting inFigure 2 fixed the unit isoquant in the (T1,T2)
plane and varied the number of workers of each type to maintain output, always
efficiently assigning worders to activities along the way. These variations
alter the intercepts and location of the corner of the efficient frontier in
Figure 1, but leave the slope of each facet unchanged. Where the activity iso—
quant touches a facet and not a corner of the frontier, A and B workershave
one activity in conmion and it is this commonality that determines the marginal
rate of substitution between them in the efficient indirect production function.
The same experiment applies when the underlying engineering technology admits
some substitution among activities, though the induced substitution among
worker types is somewhat tempered. Figure 3 illustrates the experiment in such a
case. Variations in NA and NB beyond certain limits result in unique tangents
between the unit isoquant and the activity possibility frontier at points Cand
d (these degenerate to a single point in the fixed coefficient case). NA and
share one activity at these points, which establishes a unique MRS between
them as before. Between these limits the isoquant touches the frontier at a
corner, the A's and the B's share no activities and the indirect MRS between
and B merely follows the direct MRS between and I2 The indirect MRS10
is trapped by tlB/t and t2B/t and varies smoothly in between. Hence an iso—
quant of the indirect production function would appear just as it does in Figure 2,
except with a rounded corner. Whatever the nature of substitution among activi-
ties, the indirect production function displays more substitution than the engi-
neering technology because of the substitution possibilities in the assignment
of workers to jobs in addition to direct substitution among activities.
The argument is readily extended to n activities and involves the same two
steps of first finding efficient assignments of workers to activities to construct
the efficient activities possibility set, and then varying the number of workers
of each type, maintaining efficient assignments and mapping out the indirect pro-
duction function.
The efficient activity possibility set is found by solving an artificial
maximum problem (see Dorfman, Samuelson and Solow). Define a set of shadow prices
p1 one for each activity. In context these might be thought of as piece rates.
Maximize the value of production activities subject to the capacities of each
type of worker and determine how these assignments are related to the implicit
prices. There is a simple analytic solution in the nx2 case. Consider the
problem
V =maxfp1(T+T1B) + p2(T2 + T2B) + ...+pn(T + TflB)} (6)
ij
Subject to
T/t + T2A/t2A + ...+T/t NA
(7)
T1B/tlB+ T2B/t2B + ...+TB/tB NB )11




nt >p A iA -I
I =l,...,n (9)
rB/tIB Pi
rA and rB in (8) and (9) may be Interpreted as wage rates of each type. Thus
(6) maximizes production value, while (8) minimizes cost. Since the primal
problem involves two constraints, the soiition to (8) requires that exactly two
constraints in (9) are binding, so that there aren2 possiblesolutlons. Of these,
n solutions are immediate. They require both rA =tp1and rB =tiBpifor I =
l,...,n,and correspond to the case where is so large that both A's and B's
work only at task T1 (the intercepts in fig. 1). However, the solution to (6)
may involve two noncongruent activities, say T1 and T,., Illustrated by the in-
terior corner solutionin Figure 1. Suppose Ahas comparative advantage at T1 and
B has comparative advantage at T. Consider the solution
rA/t = andrB/tjB =Pj
(10)
so that A is assigned to and B to T. Then it must also be true from (9)
that12
rA/t.A >pj
and rB/tB > (11)








which holds true for some pS/p.,, given the comparative advantage assumption.




which cannot possibly hold true given A's comparative advantage on T1, and is
therefore nonoptimal. Continuing in this way for all (i,j) pairs (ij) it
is seen that n(n—l)/2 possible assignments of workers to activities must be
nonoptimal; and only [n + n(n—1)/2] of the possible n2 solutions form a
basis for the efficient activity possibility set.
Finding the efficient frontier requires determining prices {}thatimply
degenerate solutions to (6). The 3x2 case illustrate the method.4 For the
sake of example, suppose t2A/tlA >t2B/t1Bt/t3A >t2B/t3Band t3A/t >
t3B/tlB
Let V1 represent the maximum value of activities in (6) and (8)
when type A workers are optimally assigned to T and B workers are assigned13
to T. The argument leading to (13) shows that V12, V13 and V32 cannot be
optimum for this problem. Array the other possibilities in a matrix, with
row I representing the assignment of A's to Ti and row representing the
assignment of B's to T. If does not rest on optimal assignments, its
value is left blank in the matrix. In the case under consideration
pltlANA + pltlBNB
{v1} =p2tNA+ pltlBNB p2t2ANA + p2t2BNB P2t2ANA + p3t3BNB .(15)
p3t3ANA + pltlBNB p3t3ANA + p3t3BNB
The fully degenerate solutions to (6) or (8) imply equality among various
combinations of the elements of V1. They can be found as follows.
Consider the assignment of A to T1 and B to T1, which is optimal if is
large enough. Then V11 =pltNA+pltlBNB.
Given some arbitrary values
of (p1,2,3)consistentwith the optitnality of V11, find the minimum
possible value of that maintains V11 optimal. Notice in (15) that only
V11, V21 and V31 are altered as varies. A fully degenerate solution




or the equivalent restrictions p2/p1 =t/t
and
=t3A/t]A
Now consider the element V21. Here two experiments are
required, since V21 is a function of both and p. First, find the




or the same restriction on the p's as before.
Second, change p2 and find its minimum consistent with the assumed optimality14
of V21. Since only V21, V22 and V23 are changed when p2 varies, another
fully degenerate solution corresponding to another facet of the efficient
frontier implies V21 =V22
=
V23,
or the restrictions p2/p1 = and
p21p3 =t3B/t2B•
Proceeding in this fashion for all the elements of
leads to only one more restriction, namely p3/p1 =tlB/t3B
and p2/p3 =t3A/t2A
Hence the efficient frontier has exactly three facets, one for each restric-
tion. It is shown in Figure 4 (c.f. Whitin). The restriction implied by
V11 =V21
=
V31corresponds to the lower triangular facet. Here B is
completely specialized to T1, while A's engage in all three activities. The
restriction implied by V21 =V22
=
V33corresponds to the upper triangular
facet; there A is completely specialized to and B engages in all three
activities. Finally, the remaining restriction, V31 =V23
=
V33corresponds
to the quadralateral, where A is assigned to activities and T3, while
B is assigned to T1 and T3. Notice that within each facet, A and B have
precisely one activity in common.5 The argument readily extends to the
nx2 case, and the efficient activities polyhedron has the same number of
facets as activities, so long as (2) holds.
Construction of an indirect production function in the 3—activities
case is shown in Figure 5. Each connected line segment corresponds to a
facet of the efficient frontier, with the marginal rate of substitution
determined by the commonality of activities there. Evidently the argument
above shows that if there are n activities the indirect isoquant consists
of n connected line setments. Clearly, as itgrowslarge the indirect
production function gets arbitrarily smooth and neoclassical.
It remains to be shown that the indirect production function is
supported by a price system. That this is so follows from the analysis15
of (6) and (7). Suppose workers are paid in proportion to their activity
output at unit rewards and individually choose production activities
to maximize their incomes. For example, each worker of type A chooses TiA
to maximize
p1T1A + p2T2A + ...+ (16)
subject to
TlA/t + T/t2A + •..+T/t 1, (17)
and similarly for workers of type B. But the solution to (16) is exactly
the same as the solution to (6). Therefore, the market solution is efficient.
The rest follows from the fact that the market shadow prices or piece
rates are prescribed by the efficient activities frontier, as shown
above. Consequently, the factor price frontier of the indirect production
function (5) in terms of wage rates, r., consists of n isolated points
corresponding to each facet of the efficient activity frontier, each one
of which is dual to a facet of an isoquant.For example, in the 3x2
example discussed above, the factor price frontier in the (rA,rB) plane
lies along the three rays rA/rB =t/tlB,rA/rB =t/t2B,
and
rA/rB =t3A/t3B•
The first ray corresponds to the lower triangular facet
in Figure 4. Here a person of type A is indifferent among all three





and so forth for all three facets.6 Finally,
the construction of the indirect isoquant explicitly shows that the marginal16
rate of substitution along each of its facets equals the wage ratio there.
Consequently, maximizing the indirect production function subject to a
wage—cost constraint on bodies truly does maximize output. Anyindeter-
minacy on the interior of a line segment is eliminated because Na and NB
are given.
We have exhibited a mechanism for incorporating the concepts of
skill into neoclassical production theory via the assignment of workers to
jobs, and shown how an observable indirect production function is mapped
out by variations in factor supply conditions. A number of consequences
follow:
(1) The construction points out some potential pitfalls in using
published occupational classes for productivity analysis, since the
definition of an occupation in terms of a collection of work activities is
not invariant and endogenously depends on factor supplies. Workers with
similar skill endowments will be found on different work assignments, since
differences in factor supplies locate them on different facets of the
indirect production function (e.g., the upper, lower, or middle branches
of Figure 5). This difficulty is tempered ináofar as occupational classif 1—
cations index "capacities" rather than actual endogenous job assignments.
The stated principles of occupational classification are not encouraging
in this regard, but examination of the actual classifications suggests
increasing logical difficulties with the level of disaggregation.
(ii) If worker types are tentatively identified with observed
economic—demographic categories such as years of schooling, the above shows
precisely how education enters production, thus providing a link between
supplies of human capital and less well—analyzed demands for them. Since17
differences in capacities among worker types automatically induces substitu-
tion In the indirect production function, fixed wage weighted indexes of
labor input for total factor productivity Indexes are subject to well known
substitution bias that can be easily understood in terms of this framework.
A more subtle difficulty emerges if the capacity vectors among the various
observed categories change over time, as seems likely. Unless these changes
approximate uniformity over all classes, the indirect production function
Is shifted nonhomogeneously, and both total factor productivity and the
"systematic" part of the production function are altered through time. The
latter shows up as "biased technical change." It seems probable that
variable weight Divisia type indexes advocated by Jorgenson and Griliches
might eliminate part of the problem. But it is by no means apparent that
they solve it completely.
iii. For cross—sectional analysis of production and demand, one
must be reasonably confident that the observed "capacity" classifications
are more or less uniform across data points. If not, price—quantity
observations are not mapped out of a common structure. It is not difficult
to derive examples whereby estimated substitution possibilities may be
either greater or less than the true possibilities when productivity differ-
ences within classes over the observations exist but are not statistically
controlled. In particular, one might expect this problem to be most severe
in the case of international comparisons. Simple though It is, a virtue
of this framework is in clarifying the meaning of "international differences
in technology." It is possible and plausible that there exist no differences
in direct engineering production functions, yet differencesamong indirect
observable production functions arise if there are differences in capacity18
endowments among the relevant populations. The often observed fact that
a factory in the U.S. is more productive than its identical twin in a less
developed country is partially due to the fact that the work assignments
inherent in the design of capital equipment areoptimal for the U.S. labor
force, but are definitely suboptimal for the foreign labor force because
of differences in the extent and distributions of worker comparative
advantage.
iv. This construction helps understand the well known phenomena
of skill bumping associated with layoffs and business cycles (see Reder).
So long as layoffs are not proportional across worker types, short run
employment declines imply corresponding reassignments of work activities
among employed workers, a kind of short—run substitution effect as it were.
Any differential adjustment costs that insulate some groups from transitory
demand shocks has the effect of flip—flopping work assignments among various
branches of the indirect production function isoquant. If in addition the
fixed factors (capital) embody work routines that are optimal for longer term,
permanent conditions, the short—term observations may even switch over to
inefficient regions of the indirect production function, implying systematic
variations in measured labor productivity that are consistent with observed
phenomena. Extending Stigler's idea of flexibility to this problem suggests
less specialization and rigidity of work routines in cyclically sensitive
industries to minimize these short—run inefficiencies.
v. That workers' skills are developed over the course of their
labor market and work experiences is central to the theory of human capital
and implies a progression of work assignments over the life cycle. Thus
life cycle variation in the capacity vectors t1. is to be expected and the19
indirect production function suggests imperfect substitution among age groups
or cohorts, a fact that is difficult to understand in the usual neoclassical
model in terms of efficiency units. It follows that the size of a cohort
may have an effect on relative cohort earnings throughout its life cycle.
Being a member of a relatively large birth cohort may haunt one for a whole
lifetime, as in Easterlin's relative income—fertility hypothesis. This also
would appear to explain why alternative vintages of graduates in some profes-
sional markets (notably the present academic market) fare relatively better
or worse when general demand conditions are changed. It also suggests a
common cohort variance component in wage rates that renders the covariance
between starting salary and lifetime income larger than one might otherwise
suppose, and thus makes initial salary a better predictor of new entry than
the standard permanent—transitory decomposition-would suggest.20
III. PRODUCTION POSSIBILITIES
We turn now to the case where the number of worker categories
exceeds the number of activities. Consider technologies using two
activities and denote the efficient activities frontier by F(T1,T2) =0.
Now add a third type, C, to the construction of Figure 1, with comparative
advantage somewhere between A and B: t2A/t]A >t/tc
>t2B/t1B
Then
the activities possibility set would have three facets instead of two, with
slopes corresponding to these ratios. As still more types are added, more
facets appear, filling in the corners of Figure 1 and smoothing out
F(T1,T2) =0.Its limiting behavior can be derived by making use of the
result of (13) and (14) that a price system and free choice implies efficient
assignments. Discussion is confined to the two activity case, which general-
izes immediately to iiactivities.
Consider a randomly chosen person with capacity vector (t1,t2).
Then his potential income is p1T1 + p2T2 and is constrained by
T1/t1 + T2/t2 .1.Potential income in the (T1,T2) plane is described by
a family of straight lines with slope —p1/p2. The time—resource constraint
is also described by a straight line with slope —t2/t1. Devoting
full time to activity 2 maximizes income if t2/t1 >p1/p2and similarly for
activity 1 if the inequality goes in the opposite direction. The worker is
indifferent among activities if the ratio of his capacities equals the price
ratio. Thus, there is a convenient ordering of choice by workers according
to comparative advantage: Pick an arbitrary price ratio, p E p1/p2. Then
on the efficient frontier all workers with comparative advantage in excess
of p are optimally assigned to activity 2 and actually choose it, while all
those with comparative advantage less than p are assigned to activity 1.21
As the number of types of workers becomes indefinitely large the pairs
andareconveniently described by a density function f(t1,t2), with
each worker belonging to a point in the (t1,t2) plane. The activity possi-
bilities frontier is defined parametrically by the conditional expectations
pt1
T1 =




and Is "swept out" of the density f(t1,t2) as p varies from zero (everyone
assigned to T2) to infinity (everyone assigned to T1). Furthermore,








which Implies that the slope of the efficient frontier is the shadow price
ratio itself:
dT2/dT1 =h'(p)/g'(p)=—p. (22)
Further application of the implicit function theorem demonstrates that
d2T2/dT0, so that F(T1,T2) =0is quasi—concave.22
D
Example:Let the distribution of t1 and t2 in the labor force be
independent, strongly Paretian. Then f(t1,t2) =Ma2t1a]t1 for
>1,t2 >1,where N is the number of workers andis a fixed parameter









with k =Mci/a—i,A =a/2c&—1,which yields
T2 =ku+ (x_l)(T1/kA)'cu] for T1 <kAT
=k[l+ (A—1)(T2/kA)1] for T1kAT2
The activity frontier is composed of two symmetric branches that link up
with a common slope of unity at T1 =T2
kA.
The shape of F(T1,T2) is determined wholly by the parameter .
Asgets large, workers' capacities become increasingly concentrated on
(1,1), they become more nearly alike, and F(T1,T2) =0approaches a straight
line. Clearly the construction of Figure 1 and its extension to many types23
reveals that curvature In the activity possibility frontier depends on
worker diversity in comparative advantage, and diversity is minimized when
a is large. The behavior of F as a approaches unity is more complicated
because the unconditional means oft1 and t2 become unbounded. However,
the logic about diversity suggests thatF(T1,T2) should become more like a
square, with a sharply rounded corner at T1 =T2,and that is indeed the
case. For a between these limits F(T1,T2) has a shape rather like a portion
of an ellipse characteristic of the way production sets are typically drawn
in economics. For example, for a =2it appears like a flattened quarter
circle.
Evidently the envelope theorem can be applied when rn > ii, but it
is not terribly interesting to do so because the engineering technology
already is of minimum dimension. However, just as increasing the number
of activities smoothed out the indirect production function in section II,
a similar result applies here to production possibility sets in the economy
at large. Consider two goods with technologies
x1 =min{T1/a11,T2/a21} X2 =min{T1/a12,T2/a22}.
The production possibilities set maximizesX2 given and F(T1,T2) =0.
Its construction is shown in Figures 6 and 7.In spite of the assumption
of fixed coefficient technologies, the macro production set is smooth and
all workers are fully employed. Here is another example of smooth neo-
classical macro behavior deriving from underlying distributional micro
phenomena that forms an adequate basis for macro equilibrium theory, but
is rather different from the usual construction. Notice how the activity24
set of Figure 6 maps into the production set in Figure 7 by the addition
of two vectors (each representing an allocation of activities to each good)
summing to a point on F(T1,T2). Each division of output is supported by
a unique shadow price ratio p and a corresponding division of the labor
force among activities; and the effect of the distribution of output and
product demand conditions on the distribution of earnings is immediately
revealed. Also, comparative advantage in goods production clearly depends
on the distribution of talents in the labor force, a natural and manageable
extension of the Heckscher—Ohljn kind of results to "many factors."
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IV.A LATENTFACTORAPPROACH
Analternative methodology for labor aggregation has been proposed
by Welch. The technology is specified in terms of unobserved latent factors
or "characteristics", with observed labor categories embodying the latent
characteristics in alternative proportions. It is further assumed thatany
given factor requirement can be achieved by linear combinations of worker
types, which implies a kind of perfect substitution among types depending
on the characteristics they embody. If all worker types are to be fully
employed, relative wage rates cannot deviate from the fixed technical rates
of substitution between them. Further, if the number of latent factors is
less than the number of worker categories, a basis for aggregating observed
classes to a smaller dimensionality has been found.
Let the production function be X =G(Z),where Z
latent factors, with i =l,...,v.There are rn classes
and each class is completely described by an endowment
j =1,...,rn.N. is the number of workers of type .
factorI is =EZ .Nand full employment output is
j ij j
At full employment output, the marginal product of the
defines an implicit price for it,W, up to a factor of
G1(Z) =bW1,where b is a normalizing constant, and
a member of the ith class must be
W1Z11 + W2Z21 +•+WvZi
=
y1 for I =l,...,n (23)
In addition, the linear combinability assumption implies that the latent
are the unobserved
of workers, with rn > v,
vector (Z1.,Z2.,;..,z.),
The total endowment of




characteristic vector embodied in any group can be built up by a linear
combination of exactly v other groups, e.g., there exist constants c. not
necessarily all positive such that8
c.Z +c Z +...+c.Z =Z.
ljll2jl2 vjlv lj
C1Z21 + c2Z22 + ...+CZ2 =Z2 (24)
j =v+l,...,m
c.Z +c.Z +...+c.Z Z. ljvl2jv2 vjvv vj
Finally, by the market equilibrium property (23) of a common implicit
price for each latent factor, (24) implies
y. =c1y1
+ c2.y2 + ...÷
cvjyv j =v+l,...,m (25)
There are rn—v linear restrictions on the observed wages of the rn groups,
or only v independent sources of variation in observed wages. These inde—
pendent categories are the basis for aggregating the rn observed categories
to v linear combinations.
For empirical implementation one uses cross—section data (subeconomies)
with the total endowments Z differing across observations, maintaining the
assumption of a common latent structure Z1. For example, suppose the
observations are mean earnings of various education—experience classes
across states (indexed by k). Assume thatZjk =Z.for all i,j,k, but27
let Nik vary across states. Variation in Z1 arises from differences in Nik





+ W2kZ2j + ...+WZ. j =1,...,n (26)
and may be viewed as a factor—analytic statistical model, where the implicit
prices Wik represent v latent factors and the Z's represent factor "loadings."
Notice that (26) is not identified. However, the assumption Zijk =Z.
implies that the same linear restrictions (24) apply to all observational









and may be viewed as a system of ni—v regression equations in v "independent"
variables. The c's are regression coefficients. Given a specification of
exactly v underlying factors, (27) may be estimated by regression methods,
clj,...,cvj areidentified for all j, and have the ready interpre-
tation of fixed marginal rates of substitution among types. Note that (26)
is not constant across observations because differing endowments cause cor-
responding differences in implicit prices Wik. The method works because (27)
is independent of endowments, due to the repackaging assumptions imposed on
the latent factors. This suggests a test for the number of unobserved
factors: If (27) is correct and there are exactly v factors, then adding
observed numbers of workers Nik to the regressions should have no explanatory
power. It is by no means clear how such an hypothesis is nested however.28
This model is correct and ingenious, given its assumptions. Still it
is interesting to see what happens when the assumption of a single homogenous
good is relaxed. For illustrative purposes, assume two goods with different
technologies in two latent factors. Figure 8 depicts the situation in terms
of a modified box diagram. The dimensions of the box are given by the total
endowments (z1z2) in the subeconomy (observational unit) and the contract
locus is shown as usual by the smooth curve. However, not all points on the
contract curve are feasible because workers come in fixed bundles of latent
factors. The diamond shaped area within the box represents the set of
feasible allocations and its edges represent the boundary of the parallelo-
gram sums of vectors of fixed endowments of each type of worker. The diamond
has as many facets as the number of classes of workers (in). The area between
its edges and the edges of the box cannot be obtained from feasible linear
combinations of worker types. Suppose output demand conditions result in
an equilibrium at a point on the interior (such as a). Then the mutual
tangency of isoquants there establishes unique implicit factor prices W as
before, and (26) and (27) remain valid. However, output demand conditions
may result in an equilibrium along an edge (such as point b). Now there is
no longer a single price of factors. Instead there are two sets of implicit
factor prices, one for each industry. Seemingly, this difficulty can be
handled empirically by extending the observations to industrial classifica-
tions within regions or states. This should work because the transformation
from (24) to (27) washes out factor price differences among both regions and
industries due to the fact that the same linear packaging restrictions among
workers apply to all industries and regions. Letting 1 denote industry,
the hypothesis Zjjkl =Z
must be maintained for this method to be valid.29
In other words, it must be assumed that there exist no industry—specific
skills, or no latent factors specific to industries. At this point it could
be argued, and maybe correctly, that (27) still applies in the presence of
industry—specific skills if the estimation is confined within industries
(i.e., a model such as (27) for each industry, allowing the c's to vary among
industries).
The basic difference between this model and one presented above lies
in the packaging assumptions. (24) implies statements such as "eight ele-
mentary school graduates plus three college graduates are productively equiv-
alent to 13 high school graduates." These kinds of restrictions make no
sense in the models presented here, because workers are selected into pro-
ductive activities according to their comparative advantage and there exists
a great deal of economic rent in earnings, contrary to (25). In those models,
productivity is comparable among workers who engage in the same activity,
but not between activities because different work activities requtr.e and
make use of different talents. Presumably Billy Rose's manual dexterity
played a small role in his activities as an impressario. Indeed, section II
demonstrates precisely how imperfect substitution derives from the existence
of comparative advantage and specialization. 1se factors play no role
whatsoever in (24) and (27).
A latent factor, characteristics model is still available for these
models, however. It takes quite a different form from (26) and has some
interesting features for analyzing the distribution of earnings. Consider
the model of section III, and recall that the capacities of each worker were
taken as exogenous (though perhaps affected by prior schooling decisions,
family background, etc.). We can go one step back in this process. Consider
the following linear specification:30
=b+ b1Z1 ÷ b2iZ2 + ...+b1Z
I =l,..., (28)
(28) maybeconsidered to be a "production function", where a worker's
skill capacity in activity I is determined by v latent factors or charac-
teristics. The "marginal productivity" b1 of the jth factor in producing
the ith skill is allowed to vary among skills and each worker is described
by a point in the space of Z. The general equilibrium In the economy, includ-
ing product demand conditions, determines a set of implicit prices for each
activity as above. Potential earnings in activity i arep1t1, and
yj =Pt
=
1)ib0i+ 1iiiZi + ....+
PibviZv (29)
Now (29) bears a similarity to (25), but its interpretation is altogether
different. It Is useful to think of (29) as having a factor—analytic struc-
ture, but here the Z's are the latent factors, while the pb's are factor load-
ings that are similar to prices, just the reverse of (25). Finally, assume
the latent factors are distributed according to some joint probability density
O(ZiZv)• In multivariate analysis it is customary to assume that e is
log normal, but that is too restrictive for our purposes.
From here there are two methods of proceeding:
(1) Use (29) to transform the distribution of latent factors 0 to the
distribution of potential income, 4(y1,.. .,y). It is to be emphasized that
is a distribution of earning potential. To get the distribution of actual
earnings, employ the choice rule of sections II and III that individuals choose
activities that maximize their income. Then the distribution of observed
earnings in activity i is conditioned on the fact that the earnings of people31
people found in it is greater than they could have achieved in other activities:








This kind of model was first elaborated by A. D. Roy. The main point is that
observed earnings distributions are truncations from the distribution of
earnings potential.9 Comparison of observed means across activities lead to
ubiquitous "selectivity bias", just as in the controversies about "ability
bias"in return to schooling computations. The extent and nature of these
biases evidently depends on patterns of correlation in the distribution of
earnings potential (see Roy; also Lewis, Maddala and Heckman for more modern
development). Roughly speaking, strong positive correlations among the y
lead to greater selectivity bias. Finally, the overall distribution of
observed earnings is a weighted sumofthese truncated distributions (see
Houthakker for a simple instructive example).
(ii) Alternatively, and equivalently, one maypartitionthe factor
space (Z) into acceptance regions, where max {y1,y2,. .. ,y}=
y1in region i.
This is the approach of Mandeibrot, and brings out the selection aspects of
observed earnings more clearly.10 These acceptance regions are cones11 com-
pletely determined by the relations (29). For example, suppose (29) load
very heavily on a single factor, with the effects of other factors
being negligible. This factor could be thought of as some kind of general32
ability or human capital, which transforms differently into specific produc-
tive activity capacities. Then the sorting of workers to activities tends
to be severely stratified, with the most capable workers found in the most
remunerative jobs, the next most capable found in the next most remunerative
jobs and so forth. The income distributions across activities follows a
similar rank order, because the single factor induces large positive corre-
lations in the distribution of potential earnings 0(y). The same hierarchical
stratification would occur in the presence of many factors if there were
sufficiently strong positive correlations among them. However, casual obser-
vations suggest a much more complex pattern of loadings and correlations,
in which case observed assignments need not follow any clear hierarchical
patterns. Nevertheless, the partition of Z into acceptance sets implies that
people with characteristics within well defined limits are found in each
activity. The selection phenomena remains, whatever the distribution of
factors.33
V.ANOTE ON THE THEORY OF MARRIAGE
We havebeen able to go some distance in analyzing part of Smith's
famous proposition on the division of labor, based entirely on specialization
and comparative advantage. All results above are independent of size; and
the price system is efficient and achieves the optimal degree of specializa-
tion, given the resource constraint, for any scale of operations. Thus
comparative advantage itself provides little insight into the more profound
and difficult part of Smith's proposition linking specialization with the extent
of the market. The reason for this lies in the linearity assumptions and
absence of indivisibilities imposed on the present model, which imply that
total service flows within each of the various activities are all that matter,
independently of the distribution of embodied talents among members of the
labor force. Under these circumstances the implicit prices of services
efficiently clear all markets and depend only on total skill potential in the
economy, not on how skills come prepackaged in indivisiblebodies)2 These
assumptions appear to be reasonable approximations for those activities,
such as pin making and other production work that have fairly clear—cut and
identifiable outputs. However, they would appear to fail for many other
activities where output is less clearly defined: Two mediocre economists or
doctors or lawyers do not necessarily add up to some multiple of a "good"
one. In terms of the marriage market analogy, the price system described
above does indeed optimally select workers to jobs, but the distribution of
workers across firms and the question of "who works with whom" is simply
irrelevant. In this sense super—polygamous marriages in the labor market
are pareto optimal, given the assumptions!
It is clear that any theory of selection of worker quality matched to
firmqualitymust confront the indivisibility issue at ground zero. The34
result must be to make firms play a much more active role in the sorting
process than has been described above. In addition to Smith's elegant dis-
cussion, more recent work on the theory of the firm (Aichian and Demsetz)
and the theory of signaling (Stiglitz) suggests a possible route by way
of technical externalities and true joint production in the underlying
engineering technology, thus giving an incentive for entrepreneurial activ—
itv in assembling an optimal production team and an optimal distribution
of talents within the firm. However, the discussion above points to another
fundamental source of indivisibility and that is in the operation of markets
themselves (Stigler). At a low level of output, the fixed cost of marketing
specialized talents in point sharpening, wire stretching and so forth cannot
be covered because these markets would be too thinly traded. If so, then there
are clear gains from entrepreneurial activity assembling an optimal work
force outside the market mechanism.
The following example illustrates some of the resulting complexities.
Consider a fixed coefficients production process in two work activities,
and T2, and let there be four workers, A, B, C, and D, each described by
capacity vectors as before. We know that a marriage of the four is effi-
cient and instead look for some second—best solutions due to market failure.
The restriction that workers must be assigned to two—person production teams
is arbitrarily imposed, thus allowing use of the assignment algorithm of
Koopmans and Beckmann or the marriage market solution proposed by Becker.
One possibility is shown in Figure 9, where there is a clear rank order
ofcomparativeadvantage and no absolute advantage. The second—best activity
frontiersare built up by forming all possible pairwise frontiers, as in
Figure 1,andthen adding them up along all possible rays through the origin.1335
As shown, a negative sorting by comparative advantage is second best for all
technologies. The efficiency loss from incomplete markets is proportional
to the radial distance between the efficient frontier and the negatively
sorted frontier, and is close to zero for some technologies. That negative
sorting is not an automatic result of comparative advantage is shown in
Figure 10. Here the negative assortment frontier crosses the positive assort-
ment frontier and the second—best solution is the envelope of the two.
With this distribution of talent, negative sorting is best for some technol-
ogies and positive sorting is best for others. Again, the efficiency loss
is negligible for some technologies. Note that there is a curious asymmetry
about these second—best solutions: They require four prices, one for each
worker, which combine to more than two implicit prices for activities. The
costs of assembly are greater because more information is required on this
account. Yet the differential public goods aspects of each kind of marketing
system may sustain the second—best solution even if its total resource costs
































1. As simple as it is, this variant of the familiar gains from trade
argument seems to be unrecognized in this connection. It shows how special-
ization without indivisibility leads to something that looks like an economy
of scale, though it is not a scale economy in the usual sense, since all the
production functions derived from it below are linear. Ames has attempted
to build up a Smithian technology by a series of nested neoclassical produc-
tion functions. However, if all the nested functions exhibit constant returns,
so must the aggregate function and the synergistic effects exhibited here
do not arise.
2. The following is not unlike the usual construction of neoclassical
isoquants in a linear programming framework (e.g., see Baumol), because they
are both applications of the same envelope theorem. The novelty here lies
in the nature of the constraints and in the substantive conception of the
problem.
3. In the nature of the case, constraints (4) are binding at an optimum.
Also, only left or right—hand derivatives may be defined for some N (see below).
4.(6) and (7) of course have a solution for any nxm dimension, and
the envelope theorem always guarantees existence of an indirect production
function. However, analyzing its properties requires finding the efficient
activity possibility frontier and I have only been able to do so In the nx2 base.
The reason is that the assignment restrictions such as (13) and (14) are39
considerably more complex when m exceeds 2. For example, see Jones for the
nxn case. It is clear that the parametric method used here is not very useful
for m >2.
5. If the comparative advantage assumptions are different from those
specified, there will be a different pattern of blank entries in (15). Never-
theless, the same argument shows that there are three facets on the efficient
polyheron, though their orientation will be different from those in Figure 4.
Also, if there is no comparative advantage in some activities, the number of
facets may be less than 3. This same point applies to the nx2 case.
6. Recall that a point on the factor price frontier maps to a flat on
the isoquant and that a flat on the factor price frontier goes to a corner of
an isoquant. To find the absolute values of the r's on the factor price
frontier, use the restriction Ep.c& =1to solve for the p's along each facet
of the activity frontier, and use the choice—indifference restrictions to
solve for r and r . A B. With n activities and complete comparative advantage,
the factor price frontier obviously lies along n rays.
7. The integration must be split into two regimes because of the lower
bounds on t1and t2 in the Pareto distribution. The choice of an example
based on Pareto's law is not fortuitous, but follows Houthakker's well known
example, to which this model bears a distinct family resemblance. Closed
form solutions for F(T1,T2) are not available for other simple distributions
such as the exponential or the lognormal.
8.I have arbitrarily expressed these restrictions in terms of the
first Vtypes,though any v distinct groups will do.40
9. I had originally thought that these kinds of selection phenomena
could themselves account for observed skewness of earnings distributions with
symmetrical distributuions of underlying factors. One can construct examples
where this is so, but it need not be true in general. The reason is that the
correlations among the Vs may imply truncations in some activities from both
above and below; and even if truncation occurs in the lower tail for all
activities, the configuration of implicit prices p may affect the within—
activity means in ways that do not produce the simple kind of skewness
observed in overall earnings distributions.
10. Mandeibrot begins with a formulation such as (29) and specifies
o to be (weak) Paretian, though no underlying economic structure of the model
is elaborated. Such a generating structure has been established above.
What seems odd about (29) at first glance and without a theoretical structure
is that prices of factors vary from activity to activity, a result that has
been amply justified above.
11. This is easily seen when the equations in (29) are homogeneous
(b01 =0)and there are two factors. Then the acceptance sets are open cones
defined by rays through the origin. In the nonhomogeneous case, the cones may be
closed and the partitions are less easy to compute.
12. This discussion abstracts from assortments of workers across firms
according to nonpecuniary aspects of work and other consumption values offered
by firms. Such a theory is available (Rosen) and could be grafted onto this
one without too much difficulty. The presence of income effects would seem
to imply observed talent stratification of workers across firms, but that is beside
the point here.41
13. A point on each pair's frontier defines an element of K—B's payoff
matrix and their solution maximizes the sum of payoffs. There is sufficient
structure on this problem to derive a graphical solution. In the presence
of a continuous distribution of talents, some additional insight might be
obtained by setting up an optimum control problem, but I have not been able
to do so.42
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